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Exclusionary Zoning of Community Facilities
Eighteen months ago Jimmy entered Duncraig Manor as a severely
disturbed and uncontrollable eight-year-old. His home was in nearby
Fort Bragg, where he lived with his mother and second stepfather.
Their parental supervision was inadequate and the child resorted to
delinquent activities. His poor school performance was inconsistent
with his I.Q. of 134. Emotionally he had no control and spontaneously
flew into bursts of rage. Today, after hours of intensive counseling and
hard work by the members of Jimmy's Duncraig "family," he has
reached an emotional maturity equivalent to his age, has improved his
school performance, and has reached an adequate level of socialization
skills. He has a better self-image and now can cope more adequately
with situations at home and at school.
In 1974, the creation of Duncraig Manor as a home for emotionally
disturbed children in a residential neighborhood was almost prohibited
by the town of Southern Pine$.' A two year legal battle ensued, with
Duncraig Manor and its children emerging victorious. The problem is
not unique. The creation of group home facilities is rapidly increasing
across the nation, as is opposition2 in the form of zoning ordinances,
restrictive covenants,3 and other barriers. This article will discuss the
barriers used to exclude community facilities from residential areas and
the constitutional issues that arise. Special emphasis is placed on the
history of community facility exclusion in North Carolina.
Historically, handicapped persons have been institutionalized in in-
humane facilities. Within the past ten years efforts for "normalization"
and "deinstitutionalization" have been launched nationally to compen-
1. Town of Southern Pines v. Mohr, 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 865 (1976). The town
sought to enjoin the operation of the group home because it was not a permitted use under the
applicable zoning ordinance. Id. at 343, 226 S.E.2d at 865. See text accompanying notes 32-33
infra.
2. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, SPECIAL REPORT (Letter
to Harold Russell from Bernard Posner Apr. 1979) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT]. A
home for mentally retarded adults located in Knightdale, North Carolina was recently destroyed
by fire. The home had been the object of much opposition and the State Bureau of Investigation
suspects arson. Raleigh News & Observer, Aug. 29, 1980, at 14, col. i.
3. MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE,
COMBATTING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: THE RIGHT OF HANDICAPPED PEOPLE TO LIVE IN THE
COMMUNITY 4 (1979), [hereinafter cited as MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT].
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sate for years of neglect.4 The concept of group homes falls within
these principles and makes available to the mentally retarded patterns
and conditions of everyday life which are as close as possible to the
norms and patterns of the mainstream of society.5 Advocates of these
principles believe that handicapped persons should lead as normal a
life as possible and that group homes aid them in doing so.6 Many
states include in their definition of handicapped citizens those persons
with physical, mental, and visual disabilities.7 Federal law is more spe-
cific and defines a developmental disability as one attributed to mental
retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, or dyslexia which
originated before eighteen years of age, which has continued or can be
expected to continue indefinitely, and which constitutes a substantial
handicap to such an individual.8 A "group home" or "family care
home," may be defined as "a home with supervisory personnel that
provides room and board, personal care habilitation services and su-
pervision" for unrelated handicapped persons in a family environ-
ment.9 The number of residents usually range from two to nine, with
4. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITI-
ZEN AND THE LAW 308 (M. Kindred et al. eds. 1976). California was the first state to implement
the normalization principle in 1969 by enacting the Lanterman Mental Retardation Services Act.
The act created statewide regional centers which evaluated the mentally retarded and then placed
them in an environment corresponding to their degree of handicap. Id at 308-09. For a more
detailed treatment of this subject see generally H. TURNBULL, Group Homes and Zoning, in THE
LAW AND THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED IN NORTH CAROLINA ch. 16, 1 (2d ed. 1980).
5. H. TURNBULL, supra note 4, citing Nirje, The Normalization Principle and its Human
Management Implications, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MEN-
TALLY RETARDED 181 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger eds. 1969).
6. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 4, at 308.
7. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1976): "The definition of'handicapped persons' shall
include those individuals with physical, mental and visual disabilities."
8. 42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (1976) provides:
The term 'development disability' means a disability of a person which-
(A)(i) is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism;
(ii) is attributable to any other condition of a person found to be closely related to mental
retardation because such condition results in similar impairment of general intellectual func-
tioning or adaptive behavior to that or mentally retarded persons or requires treatment and
services similar to those for such persons:
or
(iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability described in clause (i) or (ii) of this
subparagraph;
(B) originates before such person attains age eighteen;
(C) has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely; and
(D) constitutes a substantial handicap to such person's ability to function normally in soci-
ety.
On April 4, 1979, North Carolina Senate Bill 626 proposed to change North Carolina's defini-
tion of "handicapped person" to mean "a person with a temporary or permanent physical, emo-
tional, or mental disability including but not limited to mental retardation, cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, autism, hearing and sight impairments, emotional disturbances and orthopedic impair-
ments." S. 626, 1979 North Carolina General Assembly (Apr. 4, 1979). The bill was sent to the
Senate Judiciary Committee I where it received an unfavorable report.
9. S. 626, 1979 N.C. General Assembly (Apr. 4, 1979).
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the maximum number being sixteen.'° Facilities for such homes have
traditionally been located "in high population . . . low income neigh-
borhoods in which large houses can be converted inexpensively to com-
munity residences." '
I. ZONING
Zoning ordinances have been the most common barrier used to ex-
clude these facilities from residential areas. "Zoning" can be defined as
the systematic regulation and control of the use and development of
real property' 2 and has long been justified as an aspect of the police
power. 3 In 1926, the Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,4 extended the zoning power of municipalities to allow
them to regulate municipal development. Euclid approves the practice
of designating separate districts for industries and residences, and such
zoning restrictions are permitted unless they are "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare."' 5 Two years later in Nectow v.
Cambridge,6 however, the Court upheld a lower court decision invali-
dating a city zoning ordinance which prevented the use of the plaintiff's
land for business purposes. The ordinance cut off the property from
the land around it by requiririg that it be used for residential purposes,
even though the surrounding land was zoned for industrial purposes.
The Court stated that the "health, safety, convenience and general wel-
fare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected [would] not be
promoted by the disposition made by the ordinance. ... "' Since
1928, the federal courts have basically left the development of judicial
interpretation and restriction of zoning laws to the states. 18 Only re-
cently, have federal courts begun to decide exclusionary zoning cases
and to apply federal constitutional standards.' 9
10. State Zoning Laws Regulating Group Living Facilities in the Community, AMICUS 38-39
(Mar.-Apr. 1978).
11. Kressel, The Community Residence Movement: Land Use Conflicts and Planning Impera-
lives, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. Soc. CHANGE 137, at 139 (1975).
12. H. TURNBULL, supra note 4, ch. 16, at 14 n.13.
13. MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 3, at 1.
14. 272 U.S. 365, 367 (1926) (owner of unimproved land within corporate limits of village
brought suit on grounds that the building restrictions imposed reduced the normal value of his
property and deprived "him of liberty and property without due process of law").
15. Id. at 395.
16. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
17. Id. at 188.
18. MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 3, at 1.
19. Id.
3
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A. Family Dwellings
There are several types of zoning ordinances that exclude group
homes. Some "explicitly exclude such homes from single-family ar-
eas, '"20 while others define a family as a "number of persons related by
blood, marriage or adoption living together" and usually limit "the
number of unrelated persons who can live in a single dwelling."' 2 1 "A
third type of ordinance allows group homes in certain districts only if
they first comply with specified conditions and obtain special permits"
from the local zoning board.22
Most single-family residential zones are delineated by ordinances
that specifically define the term "family" in various ways. Three gen-
eral restrictive types of definitions are common: "the biological family;
the biological family plus a small number of unrelated members; and
the single housekeeping unit," which is basically a combination of the
first two.23 Two excellent examples of such restrictive ordinances were
discussed in City of Des Plaines v. Trottner24 and Palo Alto Tenants
Union v. Morgan.25 In Trottner, the Des Plaines city ordinance defined
family as "one or more persons each related to the other by blood (or
adoption or marriage), together with such relatives' respective spouses,
who are living together in a single dwelling and maintaining a common
household." 6 Palo Alto dealt with a housekeeping unit and defined
family as "one person living alone, or two or more persons related by
blood, marriage, or legal adoption, or a group not exceeding four per-
sons living as a single housekeeping unit. '"27
The constitutionality of these types of ordinances was addressed in
Village of Belle Terre v. Borass,28 a case involving a small village on
Long Island with a land area of less than one square mile. The Court
noted:
It [the village] has restricted land use to one-family dwellings excluding
lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-dwell-
ing houses. The word "family" as used in the ordinance means ...
[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of house-
hold servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living




23. H. TURNBULL, supra note 4, ch. 16, at 5.
24. 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
25. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
26. 34 Ill. 2d 432, 433, 216 N.E.2d 116, 117 (1966) (quoting Des Plaines ordinance).
27. 321 F. Supp. 908, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (quoting from Palo Alto, Cal. MUN. CODE
§ 18.04.210).
28. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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by blood, adoption or marriage.... 29
The Court re-examined the decision in Euclid and noted that the zon-
ing ordinance had been sustained under the state's police power:
The main thrust of the case in the mind of the Court was in the
exclusion of industries and apartments, and as respects that it com-
mented on the desire to keep residential areas free of "disturbing
noises"; "increased traffic"; the hazard of "moving and parked
automobiles"; the "depriving children of the privilege of quiet and
open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities". The
ordinance was sanctioned because the validity of the legislative classifi-
cation was "fairlz debatable" and therefore could not be said to be
wholly arbitrary. 3°
The Court concluded that in Belle Terre it was dealing with "economic
and social legislation," and thus the law should be sustained as long as
it was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, and bore "a rational relation-
ship to a [permissible] state objective."'" The Court recognized the per-
missible objective sought by the zoning ordinance:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one. . . .The police power is
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is
ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people.;
2
The Court looked for other constitutional violations and found no
traces upon which to base an equal protection analysis. The ordinance
was not based on race nor aimed at transients; nor did it involve any
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.3 3 Justice Marshall,
however, dissented on equal protection grounds, stressing the need for
the strict scrutiny test instead of the majority's rational basis test. He
stated:
Zoning officials properly concern themselves with the uses of land-
with, for example, the number and kind of dwellings to be constructed
in a certain neighborhood or the number of persons who can reside in
those dwellings. But zoning authorities cannot validly consider who
those persons are, what they believe, or how they choose to live,
whether they are Negro or white, Catholic or Jew, Republican or Dem-
ocrat, married or unmarried.34
Many advocates of group homes feared that the consequences of
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 6-8.
34. Id. at 14-15.
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Belle Terre would seriously impair the group home movement.35 Al-
though some courts did rely upon the decision in group home cases, a
number of state courts have followed the lead of a New York case and
have found ways to distinguish the group home situation from that in
Belle Terre. In City of White Plains v. Ferraioli,36 the New York Court
of Appeals sustained the right of a married couple caring for ten foster
children to locate in a district which the town had sought to limit to
families of related individuals. The zoning ordinance defined family as
"one or more persons limited to the spouse, parents, grandparents,
grandchildren, sons, daughters, brothers or sisters of the owner or the
tenant or of the owner's spouse or tenant's spouse living together as a
single housekeeping unit with kitchen facilities."37 The court dis-
tinguished Belle Terre by indicating that Belle Terre concerned a tem-
porary living arrangement, unlike a group home, which operates as a
permanent single housekeeping unit. The court held that by all out-
ward appearances the group home constituted a traditional family.
The New York court emphasized:
Zoning is intended to control types of housing and living and not the
genetic or intimate internal family relations of human beings....
So long as the group home bears the generic character of a family unit
as a relatively permanent household, and is not a framework for tran-
sients or transient living, it conforms to the purpose of the ordinance. 38
Discussing state policy in relation to municipal zoning, the court
stated in dicta that in some circumstances courts have found local zon-
ing ordinances void as contrary to state policy,39 but that the care of
neglected children is a permanent state concern. 40 The court did not
list these other circumstances, however, and left the issue open.4, A
number of courts have followed the Ferraioli rationale and defined
group homes as "functional families" and thus within the narrowly
drawn zoning ordinances.4
35. H. TURNBULL, supra note 4, ch. 16, at 5.
36. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
37. Id. at 304, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
38. id. at 306-07, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
39. Id. at 306, 313 N.E.2d at 759, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453. (The court referred to the N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 374-c (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Group House v. Board
of Zoning & Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978); Little Neck Com-
munity Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Citizens, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1976);
Village of Freeport v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1977).
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B. Special Use Permits
Most zoning ordinances list uses that are allowed in each area. They
also provide for the issuance of special permission for other uses on the
showing that certain conditions have been met. An "exception" or
"condition" use permit is a grant of administrative permission for uses
compatible with the prescribed zone, but which may be subject to regu-
lation for the health and welfare of the residents.43 The purpose of the
permit is to allow the municipal government some measure of control
over the extent of uses, which although desirable to a certain extent,
could be detrimental to the community." The conditional use permit
is also referred to as the "special permit," "special exception," "land-
use permit," and "unclassified use permit." The basic criteria for
granting or denying a special permit are generally based on either a
general welfare standard or a nuisance definition.45 Zoning adminis-
trative bodies generally have been allowed a great deal of discretion
because of the usual generality and vagueness of permit criteria.46 De-
cisions are made on a case-by-case basis.47
The procedure for obtaining a permit can be long and cumbersome.
Generally, an application is made to either a planning administrator or
a planning commission.48 Residents within a certain radius of the pro-
posed site are then given an opportunity to appear before the commis-
sion and present objections in an open public hearing.49 Conditional
permit applications are often denied due to the power of protesting res-
idents. They often have misconceived fears that the handicapped or
mentally retarded possess a high rate of criminality, that they are over-
sexed, or that they are carriers of disease. Though these contentions
are unfounded scientifically and sociologically, administrative bodies
are still often influenced by them and deny permit applications on the
ground of the best interest of the general welfare. Appeals may be
made to the city council or to the board of zoning appeals. In Califor-
nia, the courts will not interfere with the denial of a permit unless there
is clear evidence of fraud, illegality, or abuse of discretion.50
One danger remaining after a permit is obtained is that the facility
may still be sued by the community. One such case is Shuman v. Board
of Alderman1 in which the plaintiffs challenged the issuance of the
43. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 4, at 314.
44. Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 126, 92 Cal. Rptr. 768, 788 (1971).
45. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, Mpra note 4, at 315.
46. Id.
47. H. TURNBULL, supra note 4, ch. 16, at 6.
48. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 4, at 315.
49. Id.
50. Id., citing Gong v. City of Fremont, 250 Cal. App. 2d 568, 575, 58 Cal. Rptr. 664, 670
(1967).
51. 361 Mass. 758, 282 N.E.2d 653 (1972).
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special permit to use a ten-bedroom single-family residence as a group
home for high school students alienated from their parents. The permit
had been granted subject to a number of conditions pertaining to the
number and sex of the residents. The court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the house would destroy the residential character of the
neighborhood and upheld the issuance of the special use permit.
II. NUISANCE
In addition to zoning restrictions, nuisance litigation is a form of ex-
clusion which neighbors often use in attempting to enjoin the operation
of a facility. There are few cases where a nuisance claim has been
raised against a group home. However, the few jurisdictions which
have addressed the nuisance claim have balanced the competing inter-
ests of the safety of the community and the welfare of the individuals in
need of community treatment facilities. Two cases in this area have
dealt with a half-way house and a drug clinic. In Nicholson v. Connecti-
cut Halfway House, Inc. ,52 the Connecticut Supreme Court considered
a nuisance claim filed by local property owners in an attempt to enjoin
the use of a proposed half-way house for fifteen male ex-convicts. The
court denied relief, finding the neighbors' fears speculative and intangi-
ble. The court held: "[t]he mere depreciation of land values, caused
S by. . . apprehensions. . . cannot sustain an injunction sought on
the ground of nuisance."" Another example of the balancing the com-
peting interests is found in People v. HST Meth, Inc. , in which the
state of New York attempted to close down a methadone maintenance
clinic located in a middle- and upper-income residential area. The
clinic's patient load of 500 exceeded the maximum number recom-
mended by 200. The court noted that the neighborhood had been vir-
tually terrorized by the patients, but chose not to enjoin the entire
operation but "only those activities which . . . make it a nuisance.""
The court recommended that the clinic reduce its case load and re-
quested greater supervision of its patients.
When balancing the competing interests in a situation involving a
group home, several arguments should be considered. Residents op-
posing group homes in their neighborhood often have unfounded fears.
The most prominent argument perpetuates the belief that group homes
decrease surrounding property values. Several studies in this area show
that this is untrue. In Washington, a study of state group homes
showed that the property values actually rose because of the superior
52. 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966).
53. Id. at 512, 218 A.2d at 386.
54. 74 Misc. 2d 920, 346 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1973), aft'd, 43 A.D.2d 932, 352 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1974).
55. Id. at 922, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
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care given to the group homes.56 The Green Bay, Wisconsin Planning
Commission carried out a similar study and found no increase in the
rate at which neighboring residences within a three-block area were
sold after a group home had been located in the area.57 Another argu-
ment is that the creation of group homes will increase criminal activity.
A two-year follow-up of 105 group homes with nearly 2,000 develop-
mentally disabled residents showed that fewer than one percent had
ever run afoul of the law.58 Many groups also believe that group
homes create upheavals in neighborhood lifestyles. Several California
studies disprove this theory. The California Department of Planning
found that ninety-three per cent of the neighbors of foster homes for
elderly people reported no traffic problems; eighty per cent, no restric-
tions on children's play; and seventy-five per cent, no unusual activity
in the neighborhood.59 The San Francisco Planning Department dis-
closed that there were no noise or traffic problems anywhere near foster
homes, while a Fresno, California, study of twenty community homes
for the mentally retarded showed that ninety-six per cent of the area's
residents had no difficulties at all with their retarded neighbors.60 Even
though these residents' arguments against group homes are unsubstan-
tiated, courts and city planning boards are often greatly swayed by
public opinion and rule in their favor.
III. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
A private means of excluding group homes from residential areas is
the inclusion in deeds or wills of provisions or covenants that restrict
the land to a particular use. Restrictive covenants vary greatly in form,
and terms within a covenant usually are more narrowly interpreted
than in a zoning ordinance, because the individual generally has more
rights with regard to his own property than the state has with regard to
the property of its citizens.
In Berger v. State,6 the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the
problem of a restrictive covenant excluding a group home in a residen-
tial neighborhood. In 1973, Mr. and Mrs. William Graessle conveyed
as a gift to the New Jersey State Department of Institutions and Agen-
cies a twelve-room ocean-front house and surrounding property to be
used for the care of disadvantaged school children under the age of
nine. The property would revert to the grantors if not used as specified.
Four couples owning property either adjacent or in close proximity in-
56. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2-3.
60. Id. at 3.
61. 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).
9
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stituted the action to enjoin the use of the proposed facility. They
based their claim on the contention that the intended use of the prop-
erty would violate the negative reciprocal covenants contained in deeds
of record establishing a neighborhood scheme of single-family resi-
dences. They also claimed that such use would violate the town zoning
ordinance restricting the area to single-family dwellings. The restric-
tive covenant involved derived from a land company which originally
owned the premises. At the time of the conveyance, the company in-
cluded restrictions in each deed limiting the permissible structures on
the premises to dwelling houses with private garages and prohibiting
any manufacturing and any dangerous, noxious or offensive use. The
court examined the covenant closely and concluded that three types of
restrictions were imposed: (1) it prohibited the use of the property for
certain non-residential purposes; (2) except for a private garage, no
building could be erected that was not a dwelling house; (3) finally, the
number of buildings (dwelling houses) that could be built on each lot
was limited. The court further stated that the covenant did not restrict
the usage of the buildings to one-family residences and that multi-fam-
ily occupancy would not violate the covenant.6 2 In addressing the "sin-
gle family" issue, the court stated that there was nothing to suggest that
the relationship of the persons within a dwelling was of any concern to
the common grantor, and it could be concluded that the "predominant
interest was to preserve a family style of living. . ". ."'I The court
ruled that the home need not cease operation. The New Jersey court
also held that the state was immune from the zoning ordinance and
that the zoning ordinance violated due process by being unreasonably
restrictive in delineating permissible occupants.
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The last issue in Berger, state government interests versus local gov-
ernment interests, provides discussion for an argument often used to
allow group homes in residential areas. When group homes are either
owned by the state or operated under contract with the state govern-
ment, courts have held that the homes are immune from the applica-
tion of local ordinances.64 The doctrine simply means that the state, as
sovereign, is superior to the control of local government. It can take
the form of either sovereign immunity from municipal zoning regula-
tion or the form of the state's eminent domain power to condemn land
for its own use independently of zoning regulation. The courts usually
62. Id. at 210, 364 A.2d at 997.
63. Id. at 211, 364 A.2d at 998.
64. Brownfield v. State, No. 77-12-2995 (Ohio Ct. P. Summit City, June 12, 1978) (as cited in
MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 3, at 23).
10
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consider two important factors. First, they consider the intent of the
legislature to override local control. Second, they examine the impor-
tance of the state interest involved. Many courts analyze whether the
land is for a proprietary or a governmental function. If the function is
one which is historically performed by government, then immunity ap-
plies. The group homes must align themselves in some way with the
sovereign-through state funding, regulation, control, or even use of
state owned vehicles65-in order to be considered the state's agent.
North Carolina is the exception in this case. North Carolina General
Statutes section 160A-3926 6 and North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tion 153A-347,67 which authorize city and county zoning, specify that
the state and its agencies are subject to local zoning ordinances and
cannot claim sovereign immunity.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Equal Protection
The exclusion of group homes in residential areas raises constitu-
tional questions. The issues involved are usually equal protection, due
process, the right to travel, and the right to privacy. "Traditionally,
zoning classifications have been regarded as economic in nature" and
have fallen within the more lax standard of due process.68 In Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,69 the Supreme Court declared zoning to
be immune from constitutional attack unless it was proved that it was
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."'7° Because of the
social implications created by exclusion, many legal scholars are re-
questing that a more stringent equal protection test be applied. If the
strict scrutiny test for equal protection is applied, it must be shown that
either a fundamental right or a suspect classification is involved. The
Court has recognized three criteria in determining the existence of a
suspect classification: (1) "immutable characteristic determined solely
by the incident of birth,"71 (2) "history of purposeful unequal treat-
65. Town of Southern Pines v. Mohr, 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 865 (1976).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-381 to -392 (1976) specifically deals with the granting of zon-
ing powers to cities and towns. Section 160A-392 states: "All of the provisions of this Part are
hereby made applicable to the erection, construction, and use of buildings by the State of North
Carolina and its political subdivisions."
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-347 (1978) subjects State buildings and those of its political
subdivisions to the county zoning powers.
68. Note, Excluding the Commune from Suburbia.- The Use of Zoningfor Social Control, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 1459, 1474 (1972).
69. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
70. Id. at 395.
71. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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ment" and disabilities,72 and (3) "position of political powerlessness."73
When these criteria are applied to individuals residing in group homes,
the outcome looks favorable. Most developmentally disabled persons
possess a characteristic immutable from birth and also face unequal
treatment due to their positions of powerlessness. Arguably, there is
the possibility that a classification which seeks to exclude developmen-
tally disabled persons from community facilities could be suspect under
federal equal protection standards.
Problems arise when dealing with a classification concerning the
mentally ill. Most specialists consider mental illness to be transient-a
condition which will disappear after it "serves its purpose."7 4 Thus, the
characteristic is not immutable and not subject to strict scrutiny. It is
understandable that a community would have a compelling interest in
keeping certain kinds of people off its streets, but there would be no
compelling interest in excluding developmentally disabled persons who
pose no threat to themselves or society.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC),7  it is necessary to prove ac-
tual intent to discriminate. The case dealt with the town's denial of a
rezoning request allegedly based on racial discrimination and thus vio-
lating the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. MHDC had ap-
plied for a change in the zoning classification of a fifteen-acre parcel
from single-family to multiple-family so as to allow for the develop-
ment of townhouse units for low and moderate income tenants. The
plaintiffs alleged that denial of zoning approval was racially discrimi-
natory and violated the fourteenth amendment.76 The Court held that
"[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."77 The Court suggested six
subjects of inquiry to prove discriminatory intent: (1) the sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision,78 (2) departures from nor-
mal procedure,79 (3) discriminatory comments by public officials,80 (4)
"[t]he historical background of the decision,"'" (5) substantive depar-
tures,8 2 and (6) the legislative or administrative history.83 In light of
72. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
73. Id.
74. Comment, Exclusion of Community Facilities/or Offenders and Mentally Disabled Persons.
Questions of Zoning, Home Rule, Nuisance and Constitutional Law, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 918, 935
(1976).
75. 429 U.S. 252 (1976).
76. ld. at 254.
77. Id. at 265.
78. Id. at 267.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 268.
81. Id. at 267.
82. Id.
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this decision, to make a successful equal protection argument, one must
prove the actual intent to discriminate on the basis of handicap.
B. Due Process
Exclusion ordinances may also be challenged on due process
grounds. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,84 the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether East Cleveland's housing ordinance, recognizing as a
"family" only a few categories of related individuals, violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The ordinance defined
family as "a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the
household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living
as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit. . ... ,s The
ordinance set up further limitations. Mrs. Moore's household consisted
of herself, her son, and two grandsons (first cousins).16 She violated
that portion of the ordinance which provided that "a family may in-
clude not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the
nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of
the household and the spouse and dependent children of such depen-
dent child."8" The city argued that Belle Terre required them to sustain
the ordinance.88 The Court, however, found that the ordinance's re-
strictions had but a tenuous relation to the city's stated objectives of
preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion,
and avoiding undue financial burden on the city's school system.89 The
Court distinguished the East Cleveland ordinance from the one in Belle
Terre: the East Cleveland ordinance not only affected unrelated indi-
viduals, but also regulated "the occupancy of its housing by slicing
deeply into the family itself."90 The Court held that East Cleveland's
ordinance violated the due process clause of the Constitution by "stan-
dardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns."'"
C. Right to Travel
The right to travel provides another constitutional challenge. The
right to travel is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.92
83. Id. at 268.
84. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
85. Id. at 496 n.2.
86. Id. at 496.
87. Id. at 496 n.2.
88. Id. at 498.
89. Id. at 499-500.
90. Id. at 498.
91. Id. at 506.
92. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
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Supreme Court cases involving this right have traditionally "involved
regulations which operated to withhold a benefit from persons who had
recently moved from one place to another, while conferring the benefit
on long-time residents."93 It can be argued that exclusion on the basis
of handicap or disability "deprives an individual of the right to live in
the community of their choice-a right which should be encompassed
by the constitutional right to travel."94
In order for group homes to be included within the right to travel,
the traditional viewpoint95 would have to be expanded in two respects.
First, a right of intrastate travel would need to be established because
most residents of rehabilitation facilities travel from a state institution
to a community facility within the same state. Second, a right not to be
excluded from rehabilitation facilities must be incorporated within the
scope of the right to travel. The former expansion is consistent with
existing notions of due process, while the latter is questionable and may
be difficult to achieve.
The right to intrastate travel has never been specifically ruled on by
the United States Supreme Court, but it has been implied in dicta.96
The Second Circuit, in King v. New Rochelle Municipal HousingAuthor-
ity,97 declared a right to intrastate travel: "It would be meaningless to
describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of
personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional
right to travel within a state."98 Traditionally, five sources of the right
to travel have been suggested: the commerce clause,99 article IV, sec-
tion 2 privileges and immunities,"°° fourteenth amendment privileges
and immunities,' national citizenship, °2 and fifth amendment due
process. 03 In identifying the source of intrastate travel it would be fu-
tile to turn to the commerce clause, privilege and immunities clauses, or
national citizenship, because these clauses are concerned mainly with
national rights and interstate movement. If, however, the right to travel
were based on due process fundamental rights embodied in the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, the rationale for interstate travel would
apply with equal force to intrastate travel.1°4
93. Comment, supra note 74, at 938-39.
94. Id.
95. Id. The traditional viewpoint is that the right to travel allows persons to move from one
place to another and not withhold or deprive them of rights or benefits conferred on residents.
96. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 126.
97. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).
98. Id at 648.
99. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl.3.
100. Id. at art. IV, §2, cl.1.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.2.
102. Id at cl.l.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
104. Comment, supra note 74, at 940.
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The next issue to be dealt with is the scope of the intrastate travel
right. The right to travel encompasses protection from interference
while in transit as well as disadvantages imposed on newcomers to an
area.1"5 A Rhode Island federal district court interpreted the right to
include "migration with the intent to settle and abide."' 6 "A right to
settle and abide would imply that if a municipality prohibited a class of
citizens from moving within its boundaries and living there, it would
infringe on the right to travel."'0 7
D. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is also a basis for a constitutional challenge.
Privacy has been deemed by the Supreme Court to be a fundamental
right. ' 8 A case involving both the right to privacy and the right to
travel is Stoner v. Miler. °9 In Stoner, the plaintiffs questioned the
constitutionality of a hotel and boarding house ordinance issued by the
City of Long Beach, New York. The challenged sections of the ordi-
nance relate to the registration of the mentally ill:
Those patients requiring continuous medical or psychiatric services
shall not be registered; that such services shall not be provided by the
proprietor; that in the event such services are required, they shall be
purchased by the resident; that an interview with the prospective resi-
dents is required to determine if the facility can meet their needs; that
certain personal records shall be maintained for any person registered
and remaining in excess of fifteen days." 0
The Court declared the ordinance an unconstitutional restriction on
a citizen's right to travel."' The Court further held that the ordinance
invaded one's right to privacy by requiring that hotel staffs maintain
records of residents who intend to remain registered in excess of fifteen
days.' 12
VI. NORTH CAROLINA
In North Carolina many communities have attempted to reject group
homes-mainly through zoning ordinances,' 13 special use permits,"'
105. Id. n. 128.
106. Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970).
107. Comment, supra note 74, at 941.
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 485 (1965).
109. 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
110. Id. at 178.
Ill. Id. at 180.
112. Id.
113. Town of Southern Pines v. Mohr, 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 865 (1976) (Southern
Pines); Osborne v. Boyce, No. 78CVS75 (Super. Ct. Davie Co., Sept. 14, 1978) (as cited in H.
TURNBULL, supra note 4, ch., 16, at 7 (Davie County)); Timmerman v. Holy Trinity Church, No.,
78CVS 1657 (Super. Ct. Gaston Co., Oct. 12, 1978) (as cited in H. TURNBULL. supra note 4, ch. 16,
15
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or restrictive convenants.'" 5 Before considering North Carolina case
law it is necessary to examine the statutes of North Carolina concern-
ing group homes. North Carolina General Statutes section 168 con-
cerns the rights of handicapped persons in the state. 16 The guaranteed
right to housing in section 168-9 illustrates the state's commitment to
avoid institutional care."I7 The statute states that each handicapped
citizen shall have the right to reside in residential communities and no
one, including the State or its subdivisions, shall have the authority to
prevent any handicapped citizen from living in these areas." 18 This sec-
tion, however, appears to conflict with North Carolina General Statutes
section 168-3 which deals with the right of the handicapped to use pub-
lic conveyances and accommodations.' The latter portion of section
168-3 states that the handicapped are entitled to accommodations in
lodging places, but stipulates that it is on a conditional basis and sub-
ject to the limitations established by law. '2 Thus, this condition would
substantiate North Carolina General Statutes section 160A-392,' 2' and
153A-347,1 22 which subject the state and its agencies to local zoning
ordinances.2 3 There are other indications of state policy. The North
at 6 (Gaston County)): Interview with Al Singer, Attorney for the Governor's Advocacy Coun-
cil for Persons with Disabilities in Raleigh (Nov. 2, 1979) (Chatham County & Wilson. N.C.).
114. 30 N.C. App. 342 (Southern Pines, N.C.); Osborne v. Boyce, No. 78CVS75 (Super Ct.
Davie Co.) (Davie County).
115. J.T. Hobby & Sons, Inc. v. Family Homes, 46 N.C. App. 741, 266 S.E.2d 32 (1980) (Wake
County).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1976): "The State shall encourage and enable handicapped
persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunera-
tive employment .. "
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-9 (1976):
Each handicapped citizen shall have the same right as any other citizen to live and reside in
residential communities, homes, and group homes, and no person or group of persons, in-
cluding governmental bodies or political subdivisions of the State, shall be permitted, or have
the authority to prevent any handicapped citizen, on the basis of his or her handicap, from
living and residing in residential communities, homes, and group homes on the same basis
and conditions as any other citizen.
118. Id.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-3 (1976):
The handicapped and physically disabled are entitled to accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties, and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motor
buses, streetcars, boats, or any other public conveyances or modes of transportation; hotels,
lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or resort to which the general
public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and appli-
cable alike to all persons.
120. Id.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-392 (1976): "All of the provisions of this Part are hereby made
applicable to the erection, construction, and use of buildings by the State of North Carolina and
its political subdivisions." (Refers to municipal zoning powers).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-347 (1978): "Each provision of this Part is applicable to the erec-
tion, construction, and use of buildings by the State of North Carolina and its political subdivi-
sions." (Refers to county zoning powers).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-381 to -392 (1976) specifically deals with the granting of zon-
ing powers to cities and towns. Section 160A-392 states: "All of the provisions of this Part are
16
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Carolina State Building Code treats group homes of fewer than ten
residents as a residential occupancy rather than as an institution subject
to more stringent licensing standards.'24 Furthermore, an Attorney
General's Opinion 25 states that group homes are not treatment facili-
ties (institutions), at least for the purposes of the Patients' Rights Act. 126
Judicial interpretation of the statute has been minimal. Until re-
cently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals had considered only one
case dealing with the exclusion of group homes-Town of Southern
Pines v. Mohr.127 Southern Pines is a small winter resort town with a
concentration of golf courses, horse training facilities, and horse farms.
Mrs. Constance Baker, a co-defendant, leased her large estate, Dun-
craig Manor, to the Southeastern Regional Mental Health Center. The
property was to be used as a school and clinic for the teaching and
treatment of children with emotional and mental problems. 2  The
conflict arose over section 9.1 of the Southern Pines zoning ordi-
nance.129 The area was zoned RA-a residential-agricultural district.
The agricultural inclusion is due to several small house farms operated
in the area. It is a middle-to-upper class housing district with many
large and stately old homes. Duncraig Manor is slightly isolated from
other homes in the area due to its large acreage and its being set back
from the highway and hidden by an abundance of pine trees. Permit-
ted uses under section 9.1 included single family residences, defined as
any number of individuals living together as a single housekeeping
unit; golf courses, hospitals, nursing homes, day nurseries, public and
hereby made applicable to the erection, construction, and use of buildings by the State of North
Carolina and its political subdivisions."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-347 (1978) subjects State buildings and those of its political subdivi-
sions to the county zoning powers.
124. NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH,
MENTAL RETARDATION, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES, PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR GROUP
HOMES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED ADULTS appendix A, at 1 (1979) (quoting N.C. STATE
BUILDING CODE § 409.1(e)).
125. 44 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 343, 345 (1975).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.1 (1974 & Supp. 1977) states:
"It is the policy of North Carolina to insure to each adult patient of a treatment facility basic
human rights. These rights include the right to dignity, privacy, and humane care. It is fur-
ther the policy of the State that each treatment facility shall insure to each patient the right to
live as normally as possible while receiving care and treatment."
127. 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 865 (1976).
128. Id.
129. Permitted uses under the ordinance include: single family residences, any form of eques-
trian use, agricultural or horticultural, church, golf courses (exclusive of minature golf courses),
country clubs, fire and police stations, recreational facilities and single family homes with live-in
help. The ordinace also includes the following conditional uses: hospitals, nursing homes, sanato-
riums, riding stables and horse farms, race tracks and fox hunting jumps, day nurseries, public
buildings, public and private schools, radio and television transmitting stations and radio and
television studios." SOUTHERN PINES, N.C., ZONING ORDINANCE § 9.1 (1975).
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private schools, and public buildings. 130 The home started operation in
early 1974, and in March, the City notified the defendant that they had
ten days to make a request to the Town Planning Board to consider a
recommendation for an amendment to the zoning regulation to include
Duncraig Manor as a permitted use. This period was extended and on
May 1, 1974, the defendant's attorney appeared before the Planning
Board and requested the amendment. The Board voted unanimously
to recommend to the Town Council not to amend the zoning ordi-
nance.' 31 Their reasons were as follows: (1) there was an overwhelm-
ing objection to the change by property owners in the area; 3 2 (2) the
zoning amendment would not be in keeping with the long established
character of the neighborhood; and (3) the defendants established the
center without first obtaining approval from proper town authorities
and continued to operate after being advised and notified of the zoning
ordinance violation. 13 3 The Town Council sustained the recommenda-
tion on May 14, 1974. The Town requested that the defendants vacate,
and on Mrs. Baker's request the Town Council met in a special session
on May 21, 1974, in order to hear a request for an extension to vacate.
The Council rejected the request on the basis that it was not made in
good faith and requested the premises be vacated on May 31, 1974. On
June 4, 1974, the Town allegedly received a letter from Dr. Eugene
Douglas, Area Director of the Southeastern Regional Mental Health
Center, advising the town that the Center would cease operations. In
accordance with this, the Council extended the time to vacate to August
27, 1974. On June 25, 1974, Dr. Douglas rescinded his previous letter.
Consequently, the Town rescinded the extension and on July 22, 1974,
the Building Inspector notified the defendants to cease operation. If
occupation was continued, each day would constitute a separate offense
for which the defendants would be subject to criminal prosecution, and
if convicted could be subject to either a fine of fifty dollars a day or
imprisonment.
Before examining the court's opinion, some further explanation of
Duncraig Manor and the services it provides is necessary. Duncraig
Manor provides a home for as many as nine children ranging between
the ages of six to seventeen. Counselors are careful to balance the age
ranges. The environment is very structured and at no time are the chil-
dren allowed to freely roam the neighborhood. The children attend
local public schools which work closely with the center and its counsel-
130. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, Town of Southern Pines v. Mohr, 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d
865 (1976).
131. Id. at 6.
132. Local horse farmers led the major objections to the center.
133. Brief for Appellant at 6, Town of Southern Pines v. Mohr, 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d
865 (1976).
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ors. Those children who are severely disturbed are tutored privately in
the home. Family group meetings are held daily in order to "hash out"
behavioral and discipline problems at school and at home. When
problems do occur, children are removed from the group for specified
periods, "time outs," and lose privileges or are isolated in their rooms.
The children come from varied backgrounds. Some come from "off the
streets" and deplorable family situations, while others are from upper-
middle class homes. All have the same basic problem: they have never
learned to cope with life. Many don't know how to accept the conse-
quences of their actions. Some retaliate with emotional outbursts and
rage; others withdraw into themselves. The process of rehabilitation
takes months and often the results are not favorable. However, there
are cases where Duncraig Manor has worked wonders and given these
children a chance in life.
The Moore County Superior Court granted summary judgment for
the defendant home on June 26, 1975. The plaintiff appealed to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court. The
appellate court stated that the Center fell within the permitted uses of
section 9.1 of the Southern Pines zoning ordinance as a public building.
The court stated that the Center was a local mental health clinic, ad-
ministered, supervised, controlled, and funded by the Department of
Human Resources; it was subject to the State Personnel Act; used state
vehicles; and operated under statutory authority that created a system
of regional and local mental health centers as a government func-
tion. '34 According to the court, the defendants were performing a gov-
ernmental function. Furthermore, the court noted that the facility
could be considered a sanatorium, a permitted use under the zoning
ordinance, by defining sanatoriums as "an establishment for the treat-
ment of the sick especially if suffering from chronic disease (as alcohol-
ism, tuberculosis, nervous or mental disease) requiring protracted
care." 135
Since the Duncraig case, section 9.1 of the Southern Pines zoning
ordinance has been amended. 3 6 The area is still zoned residential-ag-
ricultural. However, public buildings and sanatoriums have been
changed from a permitted use to a conditional use. Included in condi-
tional uses are family care homes and group care homes. In order for
134. 30 N.C. App. at 345, 226 S.E.2d at 867.
135. Id.
136. SOUTHERN PINES, N.C., ZONING ORDINANCE § 9.1 (1975) (amended Dec. 9, 1975). The
ordinance was amended to include under permitted uses only single family residences, single fam-
ily homes with live-in help quarters, and relative quarters, accessory buildings, any form of eques-
trian use, agricultural or horticultural, churches, horse farms and riding stables, horse racing
tracks and fox hunting jumps. The remainder of the earlier permitted uses, including public
buildings, family care home, and group care homes were classified as conditional uses and re-
quired a permit from the Town Council.
19
Jenkins: Exclusionary Zoning of Community Facilities
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAIL LAW JOURNAL
these facilities to locate in a RA area, they now have to obtain a condi-
tional use permit from the Town Council. Though the ordinance has
been changed, the situation has improved to such a degree that the
Town has granted a conditional use permit to a group home for the
mentally retarded within the last year.
Duncraig paved the way for other group homes within the state. Os-
borne v. Boyce'3 7 reached a similar result for a group home that housed
six mentally retarded adults and two houseparents. The house was to
be operated by a nonprofit corporation that had been approved by the
Department of Human Resources and would be regulated, controlled,
and funded by the state. The zoning ordinance permitted "public
buildings and facilities" in the central business district, and the court
held that the proposed home was "a public facility ...inasmuch as
the operation is the performance of a public (as opposed to private)
program carried out by the State through the financing, control, and
regulation of the program of the petitioner non-profit corporation."' 38
In Timmerman v. Holy Trinity Lutheran Church,'39 the Gaston County
Superior Court permitted a family-model group home housing five
mentally retarded adults and a resident supervisor. The home was es-
tablished by a non-profit charitable corporation in a home owned by
the defendant church. The court said that the home would qualify ei-
ther as a philanthropic and charitable institution or as a single-family
dwelling, both permitted uses under the Gastonia zoning ordinance in
the multi-family residential area where the home was to be located.
The court emphasized that funding of the home would come indirectly
from the state and that the home would operate as a single housekeep-
ing unit. 4o
Zoning conflicts have arisen in Hickory, Mocksville, Lincolnton, Ra-
leigh, Wilson, Aberdeen, Reidsville, and Henderson. 4' In October,
1979, the Chatham County Superior Court considered a group home
case.' 4 2 The zoning ordinance in question involved a single family
stipulation having restrictive covenants attached. There was a great
deal of public protest by professionals living in the area. The court
however, denied a preliminary injunction proposed by the neighbors of
the group home. In Wilson, a group home case is pending. The city
137. No. 78CVS75 (Super. Ct. Davie Co., Sept. 14, 1978) (as cited in H. TURNBULL, supra
note 4 ch. 16, at 7.
138. Id.
139. No. 78CVS 1657 (Super. Ct. Gaston Co., Oct. 12, 1978) (as cited in H. TURNBULL, supra
note 4 ch. 16, at 7).
140. Id.
141. Al Singer, Community Living Arrangements Fact Sheet (Apr. 4, 1979) (fact sheet accom-
panying Senate Bill 626 and distributed to North Carolina legislators).
142. Interview with Al Singer, Attorney for the Governor's Advocacy Council for Persons
with Disabilities, in Raleigh, N.C. (Nov. 2, 1979).
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recently passed a new zoning ordinance which would exclude group
homes from both single, and multi-family zoned areas. A motion for
declaratory relief will soon be filed by the home proponents. Problems
are also beginning to arise in Anson County. 143 As recently as August,
1980, controversy arose over a proposed home for mentally retarded
adults in Knightdale. In the spring of 1979 fifty residents of the area
filed suit against the home owner, Family Homes of Wake County. In
June, 1980, the residents obtained a temporary restraining order
prohibiting completion and occupancy of the home. The residents
stated that the home site was not suitable for the mentally retarded and
that property values would decline.44 The lawsuit was dropped in late
August, 1980 because of its high cost. Later, the house was partially
destroyed by fire on Tuesday, August 26, 1980, and completely de-
stroyed in a second fire on Thursday, August 28, 1980. The State Bu-
reau of Investigation suspects an arsonist and is offering a reward of
$10,000 for information. 145
In the spring of 1980, briefs were filed with the North Carolina Court
of Appeals to hear a group home case in Raleigh. In Hobby & Son, Inc.
v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc. 146 the defendant operates four
group homes in Raleigh and purchased land in Scarsdale Subdivision
for a fifth home. The plaintiffs are property owners within the subdivi-
sion and allege that operation of the home would violate restrictive
covenants of the subdivision which provide: "No lot shall be used ex-
cept for residential purposes . . . [and] one detached single family
dwelling. . . ." 147 The plaintiffs did not allege a violation of a zoning
restriction because the City of Raleigh Zoning Code, section 24-29, per-
mits family care homes in all residential districts provided certain re-
quirements concerning density, off-street parking, and over-
concentration are met. The Wake County Superior Court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff. The Group Homes of Wake
County appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the lower court de-
cision in May, 1980.
The court stated that the issue was "whether the operation of a 'fam-
ily care home' complies with the restriction that the lot on which the
home is located be restricted to residential purposes, and whether any
building located thereon meets the definition of a single family dwell-
ing." ' 48 The court reviewed the definition of a family care home and
the requirements for operation. They stated that the defendant, on
143. Id.
144. Raleigh News & Observer, Aug. 29, 1980, at 14, col.L
145. Id.
146. 46 N.C. App. 741, 266 S.E.2d 32 (1980).
147. Id. at 741, 266 S.E.2d at 33.
148. Id. at 742, 266 S.E.2d at 33.
21
Jenkins: Exclusionary Zoning of Community Facilities
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
making application for operation of the home, chose to categorize the
property as institutional rather than residential. As a result, the strict
rule of construction as to restrictions should not be applied in such a
way as to defeat the plain and obvious purposes of a restriction.' 49 The
court went further and stated that the criteria for a single-family resi-
dence as defined by the North Carolina Supreme Court was not met. 15
0
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined "family" as being:
"(1) those who live in the same household, subject to the general man-
agement and control of the head thereof; (2) [dependent] . . .upon
such supervising, controlling and managing head; . . . (3) [wherein
there is rendered] mutual gratuitous services with no intention on one
hand of paying for such service and no expectation on the other of
receiving reward of compensation." 5'
The occupants of the home did not satisfy the stated requirements in
that none of the services appears to be gratuitous. 15 2 The court stated
that the employees were paid for their services, and the residents pay
for part of their room and board, while the State subsidizes the remain-
ing costs.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that they have pre-
served the single family residential character of the subdivision by not
altering the dwelling. The court stated: "Perhaps no architectural
change has been made, but we are aware that 'a house is not a home' in
every situation. Here the house is an institution."' 53
A public policy argument, which cited North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 168-9, was also rejected by the court. 54 The court con-
cluded by stating that the statute did not apply and that the residents
were not being denied their facility because of their handicap, but be-
cause the operation of the home was a commercial venture that vio-
lated a restrictive covenant.
55
On two occasions North Carolina has tried to legislate acceptance of
group homes in residential areas. In 1975, the North Carolina General
Assembly considered a House bill entitled "Zoning Family Care
Homes." The House passed the bill, but when it was returned by the
149. Id. at 743, 266 S.E.2d at 34.
150. Id. at 743-45, 266 S.E.2d 266 at 34-35.
151. Id. at 743, 266 S.E.2d at 34.
152. Id. at 744, 266 S.E.2d at 34.
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154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-9 (1976):
Each handicapped citizen shall have the same right as any other citizen to live and reside in
residental communities, homes, and group homes, and no other person or group of persons,
including governmental bodies or political subdivisions of the State, shall be permitted, or
have the authority, to prevent any handicapped citizen, on the basis of his or her handicap,
from living and residing in residential communities, homes, and group homes on the same
basis and conditions as any other citizen.
155. 46 N.C. App. 741, 745, 226 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1980).
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Senate with an amendment, the House did not concur and the bill
failed. In 1979, Senators Creech and Mathis introduced Senate Bill
626, Community Living Arrangements. The bill stated that community
living arrangements, defined as a home providing care and rehabilita-
tion to six or fewer handicapped persons in a family-like setting, are
residential uses of property and are permissible in all residential zoning
districts of North Carolina. It protected the character of residential
neighborhoods by requiring that strict state and local standards be met
and by prohibiting the establishment of more than one home in a one-
fourth mile radius. The bill also declared void private actions by land-
owners to prohibit community living arrangements. The bill was sent
to a judiciary committee and during consideration it was pointed out
that North Carolina would receive 5.5 million dollars in grants from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to build twenty-
six group homes through the state in twenty-six different counties. The
bill's purpose was to clarify existing laws and to avoid bunching of the
homes. Opposition to the bill came from the League of Municipalities.
Spokesman Frank Gray argued that opposition was not based on the
principle of the homes but was based on the fact that the bill would
constitute a state mandate of zoning. The bill was then put in a sub-
committee where it received an unfavorable report. The sub-commit-
tee explained that they felt this was a local, as opposed to a statewide,
issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although North Carolina has not yet accepted legislation in this
area, some fifteen states have statutes which prohibit the exclusion of
group homes in residential neighborhoods.' 56 North Carolina advo-
cates of group homes have not given up in the face of adversity, and
there are cases pending which have federal court potential. Efforts will
continue for state-wide legislation. Perhaps that which is needed most,
but which cannot be legislated, is a change in society's attitude towards
those individuals who are developmentally disabled. These people are
entitled to the same rights that so called "normal" persons enjoy. They
ask no more than to be able to live as a family group in a nice neigh-
156. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-581 to -582 (West Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5115-5116 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-115 (1973 & Supp.
1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59A, § 20C (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.216a(1), (2) (West
Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 252.28, 462.357(7)-(8) (West Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30:4C-2(m), 30:4C-26(d) (West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-1(c) (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5123.18 (Page Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24.22 (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE
§ 44-21.510 to -620 (1976 & Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-102 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 4409(d) (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 15.1-486.2 (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(15)
(West Supp. 1979).
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On January 27, 1981, just prior to the final printing of this volume,
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family
Homes of Wake County, Inc. ruled that group homes may be estab-
lished within residential areas.' 57 Specifically, the court allowed a
home for mentally retarded adults to operate in a Raleigh residential
subdivision. 5 8 This decision overruled two lower court decisions
which had classified the group home as an "institution."' 5 9 This classi-
fication precluded operation of the home in its existing location be-
cause the deed contained a covenant restricting use of the lot to
"residential" purposes.
The majority, in a four-to-two decision led by Justice Britt, stated:
"In virtually all respects, other than the mental capacity of those who
live on the premises, the house operates much like a typical suburban
household."'' 60 The dissent, written by Justice Huskins and joined by
Chief Justice Branch, argued that the majority went beyond "the pa-
rameters of sound legal reasoning to help these unfortunate wards of
the State" and that a different result would have been obtained if the
home had been operated by some benevolent social order for the desti-
tute or as a half-way house for ex-convicts.' 6'
Although the dissent purportedly endorsed the rights of handicapped
persons, it appears to regard more highly the rights of individual land
owners. What the dissent has failed to recognize, however, is the neces-
sity of balancing the interests of private land owners against society's
interest in providing care for the developmentally disabled. The ma-
jority recognizes the necessity for balancing these interests and arrives
at a result that is beneficial to the group home movement and the indi-
vidual land owners. Hopefully, this decision will do much to change
the public's attitudes toward the developmentally disabled and the
group home movement.
157. No. 80-72 (N.C. Sup. Ct., Jan. 27, 1981).
158. Id.
159. See notes & text accompanying notes 146-55 supra.
160. Hobby & Sons, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., No. 80-72, slip op. at 12
(N.C. Sup. Ct., Jan. 27, 1981).
161. Id. at I (Huskins, J., dissenting).
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